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Dilemma Between Definition and Morale: 
Were Korean Independence Fighters Under the 
Japanese Colonial Rule Terrorists?
Case Studies of  The Korean Provisional Government and 
Kim Il-Sung’s Korean People’s Restoration Army
Uiheang Hur
abSTracT
This paper concentrates on two specific Korean in-
dependence movements to analyze if they can be 
defined as terrorist groups. It is a very controversial 
and emotionally sensitive topic of discussion within 
South Korean society. The two selected groups are 
the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) and the 
Korean People’s Restoration Army. The historical 
context in which the two groups emerged will be ex-
plained in detail, since a clear historical context must 
be provided to help the reader achieve a good under-
standing of Korea’s unique historical setting. The two 
groups will then be analyzed in the light of politi-
cal analyst Bruce Hoffman’s definition of terrorism 
and the distinction between old and new terrorism 
and state-sponsored terrorism. The groups’ endings 
will be dealt with by some of the ideas set forward 
by Audrey Cronin. The paper will end with a brief 
case study on George Washington to see if he can be 
defined as a terrorist. A comparison between George 
Washington and Kim Ku of the KPG shows how 
emotionally, and intellectually, it is uncomfortable 
to consider the Korean freedom fighters as terrorists. 
History is written by the victors. I accept the inter-
national norm of terrorism, first to create a starting 
point for an alternative view to the characterization 
of the KPG as a terrorist group.
inTroducTion
In 2007, a British professor described the last leader 
of the Korean Provisional Government, Kim Ku, as 
a terrorist (The Korea Herald, August 29). South Ko-
rean students refuted this description, but the Brit-
ish professor did not understand the problem. South 
Korean people still remember the brutal colonial rule 
of Japan during the 20th century; the scars are still 
healing. A non-Korean individual may ask why such 
anger is still present in the 21st century. The answer is 
that colonization only ended a few decades ago when 
South Korean grand- or great-grandparents were still 
young. Much as it would be intellectually and emo-
tionally uncomfortable for American people to char-
acterize George Washington as a terrorist, it is also 
difficult for South Koreans to characterize their he-
roes and patriots as terrorists. Nevertheless, it is true 
that many of the Korean independence movements 
did involve violence that Hoffman would define as 
terrorism. In particular, the Korean Provisional Gov-
ernment (KPG) and the Korean People’s Restoration 
Army (KPRA), selected for case studies, can be de-
fined as terrorists according to Hoffman’s definition. 
It is emotionally uncomfortable to accept the defini-
tion, but it is intellectually necessary to acknowledge 
an established international norm. 
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hiSTorical conTexT
JapaneSe colonizaTion of The korean 
peninSula
Until the 19th Century, the Chosun Empire, under 
the rule of Lee Dynasty, governed the Korean penin-
sula for five hundred years. In the late 1800s, Cho-
sun opened up some of their ports to foreign trade. 
Because of the geopolitical location between China 
and Japan, the abundance in underdeveloped natu-
ral resources and large population size, numerous 
strong states began to extend their influences into 
Korean peninsula including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Russia, China, and Japan. Three of 
these states were particularly interested in maximiz-
ing their power over the Korean peninsula—Russia, 
China, and Japan. Nevertheless, during this period, 
China was politically unstable with its own civil con-
flicts and therefore, their policies toward Korea were 
insignificant in the beginning. Within two decades 
of Korea opening some ports, the Russo-Japanese 
War erupted. Japan had long been interested in oc-
cupying the Korean peninsula ever since the 1500s, 
and had already carried out two invasions that almost 
succeeded in destroying the Korean empires. In July 
1905, the Taft-Katsura Agreement was made between 
the Japanese government and U.S. government. U.S. 
President Roosevelt concluded that, “Japanese con-
trol over Korea was an appropriate means to prevent 
the further expansion of Russian power” (Yi 309). 
Thus, the agreement allowed Japan to occupy the Ko-
rean peninsula as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. 
In September 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth offi-
cially ended the Russo-Japanese War and Japan was 
victorious. Japan consequently proceeded with their 
imperialism to occupy the Korean peninsula, forcing 
the Chosun Emperor Kojong to sign the Protectorate 
Treaty on November 17, 1905. The Treaty allowed 
the Japanese parliament to send a governor general 
to take full authority over all of the Chosun’s foreign 
relations. It completely destroyed Chosun’s standing 
in the international community as an independent 
state. Following this, the Japanese government took 
over the Chosun government and General Governor 
Ito Hirobumi was titled the chief executive. 
In October 1909, An Joong Keun, a young Korean 
nationalist, assassinated Ito Hirobumi using a gun. It 
was the first major Korean nationalist violence as an 
attempt to protect the nation from the Japanese colo-
nization. In August 1910, the last Korean Emperor, 
Soonjong, was forced to abdicate from the throne 
and yield the country to the Japanese parliament. 
The Chosun Empire officially collapsed (from here 
on, ‘Korea’ is used instead). The Treaty of Annexation 
that extinguished Korea as an international person-
ality was signed (Simons 125) and the Japanese an-
nexation of Korea was complete (Yi 313). 
The riSe of korean independence movemenTS
Between 1910 and 1919, the Korean people formed 
some peasant-based movements to liberate the coun-
try. The major event that sparked the rise of Korean 
nationalism occurred when the U.S. President Wil-
son declared his Fourteen Points, which enunciated 
the doctrine of self-determination (Lee 101). The 
idea of self-determination stimulated the passions of 
educated Korean students and religious leaders. 
However, when Japanese rule did not end after World 
War I, Korean nationalism for self-determination 
quickly increased. The Korean patriots in exile organ-
ized the New Korea Youth Association in Shanghai 
and sent its representative to Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919 to appeal for Korean independence. A few 
other similar cases followed. However, these appeals 
were all rejected by the Western powers. They were 
not interested in giving the Korean people self-deter-
mination. 
As a result, various religious organizations including 
Christians and Buddhists decided to proclaim Ko-
rean independence to attain international support. 
These organizations sent their representatives to sign 
the Korean Declaration of Independence in Seoul. 
On March 1, 1919, thirty-three Koreans officially 
promulgated the Declaration of Independence in the 
center streets of Seoul. A massive street demonstra-
tion followed, led by Korean students who shouted, 
“Taehan tongnip manse!” (“Long live Korean In-
dependence!”). The news of the Declaration of In-
dependence spread out to the whole peninsula and 
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stirred more than two million Koreans to join the 
street demonstration (Yi 344).
However, these peaceful demonstrations were bru-
tally crushed by the Japanese police forces, army, 
and the navies that arrested 46,948, killed 7,509, 
and injured 15,961 Korean demonstrators (Yi 344). 
Nevertheless, the Western powers remained quiet 
toward such inhumane repression. After World War 
I, Japan’s standing in the international community 
was strong, and consequently, these demonstrations, 
known now as the March First Movement, “failed to 
win the support of the Western powers” (Yi 344). 
The last resort of peaceful struggle for independence 
had failed. Such failure led to the formation of nu-
merous independence movements in Korea, Man-
churia, and China. Among them were the Korean 
Provisional Government in Shanghai and the Korean 
People’s Restoration Army of Kim Il-Sung.
caSe STudy 1:  
The korean proviSional governmenT: iS iT a TerroriST group?
characTeriSTicS
In April 1919, the Korean Provisional Government 
of the Republic of Korea (Taehan Minguk Imsi 
Chongbu, the KPG) was established in Shanghai. 
The KPG was a structural government that imposed 
democracy, electing officers such as the Premier (Syn-
gman Rhee) and the Ministers of various depart-
ments. Between 1919 and 1925, the KPG actively 
sought foreign support through diplomatic means. 
Premier Syngman Rhee put in his best effort to sway 
U.S. support for Korea’s liberation.. However, their 
appeals once again failed to gain the interests of the 
Western powers. 
In 1926, Syngman Rhee lost the support of the mem-
bers of the KPG and was ousted. Afterwards, Rhee 
stayed in the U.S., naming himself the representative 
of all the Korean revolutionaries. In 1926, Kim Ku 
was elected as the next President of the KPG. He was 
a rightist revolutionary who had been a prominent 
freedom fighter since the late 19th century. Kim Ku 
was one of the more aggressive revolutionaries and 
he directed several cases of violence for the first time 
after the establishment of the KPG. 
In 1932, Kim Ku directed two events that could be 
labeled as terrorist actions. First, on January 8, 1932, 
a young member of the KPG, Yi Pong-Chang, threw 
a hand grenade at the Japanese emperor outside the 
Sakurada Gate of the palace in Tokyo. The attempt 
failed and Yi Pong-Chang was sentenced to death. 
The second took place later that year on April 29. 
Another member of the KPG, Yun Pong-gil, threw 
a bomb in Shanghai at a large-scale military parade. 
The explosion seriously injured the Japanese minis-
ter, Shigemisu Mamoru, and many other Japanese 
government officials. 
TerroriSm by definiTion
Was the KPG a terrorist organization? Bruce Hoff-
man laid out his definition of terrorism by providing 
five criteria by which to determine acts as terrorism. 
The criteria follow as such: Terrorism is:
1) ineluctably political in aims and mo-
tives, 2) violent—or, equally important, 
threatens violence, 3) designed to have 
far-reaching psychological repercussions 
beyond the immediate victim or target, 
4) conducted either by an organization 
with an identifiable chain of command 
or conspiratorial cell structure…5) per-
petrated by a subnational group or non-
state entity (Hoffman 40).
First, the KPG certainly had political aims and mo-
tives. The primary reason for the KPG’s establish-
ment was because, “a government was needed in 
order to obtain public support at home and abroad 
and to prepare…attaining independence” (Lee 130). 
By 1919, there was no Korean government; it was 
extinct with the annexation of the country. Thus, 
even though the legitimacy of the KPG is very con-
troversial, the leaders of the March First Movement 
attempted to establish a rightful Korean government 
for the Korean people while in exile.
Second, the KPG began to use violence into the 
1930s. Two of the main reasons that the KPG chose 
to use terrorist tactics were the increasing domina-
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tion of the Japanese Empire in Northeast Asia as well 
as the 1931 Korean massacre of Chinese people in 
Korea. On July 1931, some Koreans massacred many 
Chinese residents in the Korean peninsula and de-
stroyed their property. 
The cause of the massacre was due to exaggerated re-
ports of a dispute between some Korean and Chinese 
farmers. This degraded the attitude of the Chinese 
public towards the KPG in Shanghai; it became much 
more hostile and suspicious environment against the 
KPG. On the other hand, some Japanese troops at-
tacked Chinese troops in Mukden in December. It 
signaled to the KPG that the Korean nationalists 
engaging in independence movements in Manchu-
ria might face extinction if the Japanese troops suc-
cessfully occupied Manchuria. Within such context, 
Kim Ku commanded the two terrorist plans in 1932 
to fight back against the Japanese expansion and 
hopefully regain the support of the Chinese public. 
Third, the bombings targeted the symbols of Japanese 
expansionism, the Emperor, and the government of-
ficials. These symbols were specifically targeted to 
show that the KPG was fighting against the Japanese 
colonization in Korea. It was certainly expecting to 
bring about a larger goal than merely assassinating 
the targets—that of Korean independence. Although 
it is unclear how other members of the KPG were 
involved in organizing the two bombings, Hoffman’s 
fourth criteria is satisfied by the command of the 
KPG’s leader, Kim Ku.
Last, was the KPG a subnational group or a non-state 
entity? It was certainly a subnational group. There is 
confusion as to whether the KPG should be regarded 
as a state or not. The definition of ‘state’ as accepted 
by the international community follows:
The state is a sovereign actor with a cen-
tral government that rules over a popula-
tion and territory and protects and rep-
resents that population in international 
politics (Henderson 28). 
This is offered by the 1933 Montevideo Convention. 
Although the convention was held after the estab-
lishment of the KPG, the definition of statehood 
accepted by the current international society is the 
definition set by the Montevideo Convention. Thus, 
it is unavoidable to look into history from the es-
tablished, accepted international perspective about a 
legitimate statehood. 
According to this definition, the KPG was a govern-
ment in exile without a population and territory to 
protect and represent. The Korean population and 
the territory were under the direct control of the 
Japanese colonial government in Korea. It can be ar-
gued that the Japanese rule in Korea was illegitimate. 
However, according to the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, the Protectorate Treaty, and 
the Annexation Treaty are accepted as international 
law. Treaty is accepted as “an international agreement 
concluded between states in written form and gov-
erned by international law” (Henderson 65). There-
fore, even though the Protectorate Treaty and the 
Annexation Treaty were signed under the oppression 
of Japan, the treaties unfairly gave the Japanese rule 
over Korea legitimacy. Furthermore, it is important 
to understand that the international concept of co-
lonialism was alive at this point of history. Most of 
the major powers had their own colonial empires; 
hence, the Japanese occupation of Korea would not 
have been seen as exceptional from the international 
society back then. In short, the KPG was a non-state 
entity and because it eventually used terrorist tactics 
to further their goals, the KPG turned into a terrorist 
group into the 1930s under such a frustrating his-
torical context.
It is important to note that the KPG was not organ-
ized to perpetrate terrorist acts. In fact, Kim Ku nec-
essarily directed the two terrorist tactics, because the 
KPG “carried on a tenuous existence in the shadow 
of the Kuomintang” (Paige 20) in Shanghai. The 
matter was concerned with the group’s survival, as 
well as the achievement of their ultimate goal. The 
KPG was an independence movement, pursuing a 
national independence. That is why the group started 
as a structurally democratic government, which did 
eventually perpetrate terrorism because of the histori-
cal context it existed under. Therefore, it is incorrect 
to characterize the KPG to similar, modern, terrorist 
groups, such as al-Qaeda. The two groups are signifi-
cantly different in their motivations for perpetrating 
terrorism. For al-Qaeda, they have the “obligation to 
wage war against the far enemy…whenever possible” 
(Booth and Dunne 52), which suggests that the main 
purpose of organizing the group was to perpetrate 
terrorism. 
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On the other hand, the KPG partially represented 
old terrorism. There are two key features that distin-
guish old terrorism from new terrorism, according 
to Hoffman. First, old terrorist groups used old me-
dia, which was used to attract attention to the group’s 
cause (Hoffman 194). The KPG had their own news-
paper publisher, the Independence News, which was 
used to share information and bring nationalism to 
the Korean patriots in Korea, China, and Hawaii (Si-
mons 136).
Second, the KPG was active before the hijacking of 
the Israeli commercial flight in 1968, which Hoffman 
indicates as the end line of old terrorism. Hoffman 
argues that the event allowed the terrorists to realize 
that the “operations perpetrated in countries other 
than their own…were a reliable means of attracting 
attention to themselves and their cause” (Hoffman 
64), which eventually led to the internationalization 
of their activities. The KPG did indeed hope for the 
internationalization of their goal; however, the group 
did not use terrorism to achieve it.
The ending of The kpg
Upon the liberation of Korea on August 15, 1945, 
the main goal of the KPG had disappeared. How-
ever, the legitimacy of the KPG as a rightful govern-
ment was rejected by the Allied Powers and instead, 
the Republic of Korea was established with Syngman 
Rhee as the founding father. Hence, when the lead-
ers of the KPG, including Kim Ku, had to return to 
Korea on November 29, 1945, they were recognized 
as ordinary citizens. It is possible that Syngman Rhee 
was not keen on accepting his former political rivals 
as esteemed freedom fighters in his newly established 
country, Republic of Korea. The KPG was thus dis-
banded, and it failed to develop into a legitimate Ko-
rean government after liberation. 
According to Audrey Cronin, when terrorism suc-
ceeds “it yields benefits for those on whose behalf it 
is undertaken” (Cronin 74). It suggests that although 
Korean independence was not achieved by the KPG’s 
struggle, the Korean people still benefited from the 
liberation itself and therefore, the core reason for 
the KPG’s struggle for independence was satisfied.
Furthermore, the KPG seems to have achieved their 
strategic aim, but not tactical aims. Audrey Cronin 
claims that “most organizations have used terror-
ism as a means to achieve either short-term, tactical 
(proximate) aims or long-term, strategic (ultimate) 
goals” (Cronin 77). For the KPG, the short-term, 
tactical aim of perpetrating the first terrorist act 
would have been assassinating the Japanese emperor, 
which failed. However, the KPG was not an organi-
zation established for violent motivations. The core 
goal of the group (the long-term strategic goal) was 
national independence, which did eventually occur. 
Therefore, it would be partially correct to claim that 
the KPG’s strategic goal was achieved. It would not 
be fully correct to say so, because Korean liberation 
was achieved by the Japanese surrender to the Allies 
after the U.S. nuclear bombings of Nagasaki and Hi-
roshima, and not by the KPG’s nationalist activities. 
caSe STudy 2:  
kim il-Sung and hiS korean people’S reSToraTion army
characTeriSTicS
The Korean Communist Party was first established in 
Seoul in 1925. However, it ceased to exist by 1928 
because of the strong repression by Japanese police 
forces (Paige 19). Many members of the Community 
Party fled to Manchuria, where they set up guerilla 
groups, one of which a communist freedom fighter, 
Kim Il-Sung joined. In September 1931, the Japa-
nese troops invaded Manchuria, which threatened 
the Korean guerilla fighters. In response, Kim Il-
Sung, organized the Anti-Japanese People’s Guerrilla 
Army (AJPGA) in early 1932. 
The AJPGA was reorganized into the Korean Peo-
ple’s Restoration Army (the KPRA) in March 1934. 
The main goal of the KPRA was “to overthrow the 
colonial rule of Japanese imperialism in Korea and 
bring national independence and social emancipa-
tion to the Korean people” (Simons 143). Until the 
early 1940s, Kim Il-Sung led the KPRA and engaged 
in several guerilla warfare attacks against the Japanese 
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troops and police forces at Taipingkou, Lao-heishan, 
and Shantungtun (Simons 144). During the 1930s, 
the Chinese Communist Party commanded many of 
Kim Il-Sung’s anti-Japanese guerilla activities. Into 
the 1940s, Japanese expansionism strengthened and 
Japanese forces marched into China’s territory. In re-
sponse to this, Kim Il-Sung and the KPRA moved 
into the Soviet Union for protection, where the group 
was supported by the Soviet Union to continue fight-
ing against the Japanese forces.
TerroriSm by definiTion
In light of Hoffman’s definition, Kim Il-Sung was 
a terrorist. Through the KPRA, Kim Il-Sung used 
violence to achieve the liberation of Korea, guerilla 
tactics to consistently shake the Japanese colonial 
rule in Korea, and the KPRA was definitely a non-
state entity. The KPRA can be seen as an insurgency. 
Audrey Cronin says, “to assert terrorist organizations 
and insurgencies can be neatly distinguished would 
be foolish” (Cronin 153), which suggests that there 
are not many differences between an insurgency and 
a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, the KPRA’s ac-
tivities are similar to those of the Ethniki Organosis 
Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) of Cyprus that is con-
sidered to represent old terrorism. The KPRA used 
guerilla tactics, but not a full-scale war, which was 
also widely utilized by the EOKA to fight against the 
British troops.Moreover, Hoffman’s second category 
says, “terrorism is violent—or, equally important, 
threatens violence” (Hoffman 40). The existence of 
the KPRA under the Japanese colonial rule threat-
ened to use violence against the Japanese authori-
ties—which was certainly terrorism from a Japanese 
perspective. The KPRA was so efficient that when 
they expanded their activities to a general offensive 
throughout the country, it was expected that “the 
whole of Korea would have fallen to Kim Il-Sung 
in August 1945” (Simons 151) if the foreign powers 
had not engaged Korea. 
The KPRA was supported by the Chinese Commu-
nist Party and the Soviet Union. This can be charac-
terized as state-sponsored terrorism. China and the 
Soviet Union were both threatened by Japanese ex-
pansionism. Therefore, their support for Kim Il-Sung 
and the KPRA can be understood as state-sponsored 
terrorism from Hoffman’s description, because Hoff-
man claims that states may “embrace terrorism as 
a deliberate instrument of foreign policy: a cost-ef-
fective means of waging war covertly…” (Hoffman 
258). With this view in mind, China and the Soviet 
Union were utilizing the KPRA as an instrument to 
oppress the Japan’s expansionism from inside the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of Japan.
The ending of The kpra
The ending of the KPRA was similar to the KPG’s 
ending, in that the KPRA’s main goal of Korean inde-
pendence was indirectly achieved with the surrender 
of the Japanese emperor. However, the KPRA was 
not disbanded, unlike the KPG. After the surrender 
of the Japanese emperor in August 15, 1945, there 
were some Japanese troops who rejected the return 
to Japan and had ambitions to continue the Japanese 
imperialism. The Soviet Red Army and the KPRA 
cooperatively fought against the last Japanese troops 
in northern Korea. Afterwards, with the support of 
the Soviet Union, Kim Il-Sung founded the Central 
Organizing Committee of the Communist Party of 
North Korea, which established the structural foun-
dation for the development of North Korea. 
In February 1946, the North Korean Provisional 
People’s Committee was established with Kim Il-
Sung as chairman, which became the People’s Com-
mittee of North Korea a year after. By September 
1948, Kim Il-Sung was no longer a terrorist. He was 
the Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea. Thus, Kim Il-Sung achieved statehood, which 
he built using the foundations of the KPRA. Since 
terrorism must be perpetrated by a non-state entity, 
Kim Il-Sung and the KPRA were no longer terrorists 
and thus, their terrorism came to an end.Neverthe-
less, it may be argued that North Korea is now per-
petrating terrorism on its own people. Cronin argues 
that “when they deliberately target innocents…that 
behavior is wrong and…is ‘terrorism’” (Cronin 164), 
which can be used to argue that the current North 
Korean regime’s suppression over their citizens using 
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indoctrinations, cult of personality, and various re-
strictions in the lives of the innocent North Korean 
people can be characterized as terrorism. Therefore, 
to a certain extent, the terrorism that had begun with 
Kim Il-Sung’s independence movement during the 
Japanese colonial era seems to have passed down the 
generation to this day.
underSTanding The SouTh korean public’S emoTional diScomforT in 
characTerizing The kpg aS a TerroriST group
WaS george WaShingTon a TerroriST?
George Washington (1732-1799) became the first 
President of the United States of America after six 
years of leading the Continental Army against Brit-
ish rule on the American continent. He is respected 
by the American people as the founding father of the 
country. According to Dr. Victoria Farmer, George 
Washington can be defined as a terrorist (October 
25, 2013). However, it would be very uncomfortable 
for the American public to acknowledge that Wash-
ington may fit into Hoffman’s definition of terrorism. 
First, George Washington’s Continental Army was 
driven by political aims and motives to oust Brit-
ish rule in America. Second, George Washington’s 
Continental army did use violence, and did threaten 
violence by its very existence against the British au-
thority. Third, the various attacks the Continental 
Army launched against the British were aiming for 
the independence of American people, rather than 
merely defeating the British troops in certain regions. 
Fourth, the Continental Army was a very well or-
ganized group of militants under the leadership of 
George Washington, and the support of the Con-
tinental Congress. Last, the Continental Army was 
certainly a non-state entity. By Hoffman’s definition, 
which is definitely widely accepted by the current 
international society regarding terrorism, George 
Washington may well be a terrorist.
However, the general view of George Washington is 
that he is not a terrorist. Moreover, I personally do 
not consider George Washington as a terrorist. Thus, 
if the KPG and Kim Ku are perceived from a simi-
lar point of view, I believe it would be easier for the 
American people to sympathize with the South Kore-
an public when it comes to deal with the definitional 
dilemma. It is socially difficult to recognize people 
who fought for our rightful freedom, the rightful 
Wilsonian self-determination, as terrorists. 
The main reason that George Washington is respect-
ed as a hero is because he successfully ousted the Brit-
ish rule from America and attained the statehood of 
his nation. Is it not similar to how Kim Il-Sung used 
the KPRA to establish the statehood of North Ko-
rea? Nevertheless, we do not consider Kim Il-Sung 
and George Washington equally as heroes. They are 
almost the two contradicting political figures in his-
tory. As such, if Kim Ku had been successful in his 
leadership as the president of the KPG and achieved 
Korean independence, Korean history would be dif-
ferent. The KPG would not be considered as a ter-
rorist group anymore, because it would then be con-
sidered as the foundation for the Republic of Korea 
by the current history. 
concluSion
Because of its geopolitical location, Korea has expe-
rienced many tragedies throughout history. During 
Japanese colonialism, numerous Koreans stood up to 
protect their country from being annihilated by Ja-
pan. Among those Koreans were strong leaders, such 
as Kim Ku and Kim Il-Sung, who organized separate 
independence movements in different forms. 
Kim Ku’s Korean Provisional Government started off 
as a democratic institution without legitimacy. But it 
eventually used some terrorist tactics for the survival 
of the group and the desperate desire for national in-
dependence. On the other hand, Kim Il-Sung started 
off as a terrorist. His Korean People’s Restoration 
Army was a guerilla militant group, which used sim-
ilar tactics to those used by the EOKA in Cyprus. 
However, even though the two sides were active dur-
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ing the same time period, and for the same cause, the 
KPG and the KPRA ended differently. The KPG was 
disbanded upon the liberation of Korea for failing to 
attain acknowledgement from foreign powers as the 
legitimate government of Korea. The KPRA on the 
other hand, achieved statehood under the leadership 
of Kim Il-Sung, and large support from the Soviet 
Union. 
It is always difficult to acknowledge the heroes of in-
dependence as terrorists. For us South Koreans, con-
sidering Kim Ku as a terrorist is exactly the same as 
when Americans have to accept the fact that George 
Washington can also be defined as a terrorist. How-
ever, it would be important to accept what has been 
set up by the international norm to function as an in-
dependent state, with good standing, and effectively 
assert for our legitimate rights in the international 
society.
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